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ABSTRACT
In recent years, malicious information had an explosive growth in social media, with serious social
and political backlashes. Recent important studies, featuring large-scale analyses, have produced
deeper knowledge about this phenomenon, showing that disinformation spreads faster, deeper and
more broadly than the truth on social media, where bots and echo chambers play an important role
in diffusion networks. Following these directions, we explore the possibility of classifying news
articles circulating on social media based exclusively on a topological analysis of their diffusion
networks. To this aim we collected a large dataset of networks on Twitter pertaining to news articles
published on two distinct classes of sources, namely outlets that convey mainstream, reliable and ob-
jective information and those that fabricate and disseminate various kinds of disinformation stories.
We carried out an extensive comparison of these networks using several alignment-free approaches
including basic network properties, centrality measures distributions, and network distances. We
accordingly evaluated to what extent these features allow to discriminate between the networks as-
sociated to the aforementioned news domains. Our results highlight that the communities of users
spreading mainstream rather than disinformation news tend to shape diffusion networks with subtle
yet systematic differences. This opens the way to promptly and correctly identifying disinformation
on social media by solely inspecting the resulting diffusion networks.
Keywords computational social science | disinformation | complex networks | Twitter
Introduction
In recent years social media have witnessed an explosive growth of malicious and deceptive information. The research
community usually refers to it with a variety of terms, such as disinformation, misinformation and most often false
(or ”fake”) news, hardly reaching agreement on a single definition [12, 26, 9, 5, 22]. Several reasons explain the
rise of such malicious phenomenon. First, barriers to enter the online media industry have dropped considerably and
(dis)information websites are nowadays created faster than ever, generating revenues through advertisement without
the need to adhere to traditional journalistic standards (as there is no third-party verification or editorial judgment
for online news) [2]. Second, human factors such as confirmation biases [15], algorithmic biases[7, 12] and naive
realism [19] have exacerbated the so-called echo chamber effect, i.e. the formation of homogeneous communities
where people share and discuss about their opinions in a strongly polarized way, insulated from different and contrary
perspectives [2, 6, 25, 24, 16]. Third, direct intervention that could be put in place by platform government bodies for
banning deceptive information is not encouraged, as it may raise ethical concerns about censorship [12, 22].
The combat against online disinformation is challenged by: the massive rates at which malicious items are produced,
and the impossibility to verify them all [22]; the adversarial setting in which they are created, as disinformation sources
usually attempt to mimic traditional news outlets [12]; the lack of gold-standard datasets and the limitations imposed
by social media platforms on the collection of relevant data [17].
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Most methods for ”fake news” detection are carried out by using features extracted from the news articles and their
social context (notably textual features, users’ profile, etc); existing techniques are built on this content-based evidence,
using traditional machine learning or more elaborate deep neural networks [17], but they are often applied to small,
ad-hoc datasets which do not generalize to the real world [17].
Recent important studies, featuring large-scale analyses, have produced deeper knowledge about the phenomenon,
showing that: false news spread faster and more broadly than the truth on social media [26, 23]; social bots play an
important role as ”super-spreaders” in the core of diffusion networks [22]; echo chambers are primary drivers for the
diffusion of true and false content [6]. In this work, we focus on analyzing the diffusion of disinformation items along
the direction pointed by these studies.
Leveraging the sole diffusion network allows to by-pass the intricate information related to individual news articles–
such as content, style, editorship, audience, etc–and to capture the overall diffusion properties for two distinct news
domains: reputable outlets that produce mainstream, reliable and objective information, opposed to sources which
notably fabricate and spread different kinds of disinformation stories. We consider any article published on the former
domain as a proxy for credible and factual information (although it might not be true in all cases) and all news published
on the latter domain as proxies for false news. Our approach is robust, as no adversarial interventions may realistically
take place to manipulate information diffusion topologies, due to the inherent complexity of social media networks.
The contribution of this work is manifold. We collected thousands of re-tweeting diffusion networks pertaining to
the aforementioned news domains and we carried out an extensive network comparison using several alignment-
free approaches. These include global network properties, centrality measures distributions and network distances.
Based on the results of the analysis, we show that it is possible to classify networks pertaining to the two different
news domains with high levels of accuracy, using simple off-the-shelf machine learning classifiers. We provide an
interpretation of classification results in terms of topological network properties, discussing why different features are
the footprint of how the communities of users spread news from these two different news domains.
Methodology
Mainstream versus Disinformation
As highlighted by recent research on the subject [12, 5, 9, 22, 26], it is hard to reach consensus on a definition for
malicious and deceptive information; consequently, to assess whether a news outlet is spreading unreliable or objective
information is a controversial matter, subject to imprecision and individual judgment. The consolidated strategy in the
literature–which we follow in this work–consists of building a classification of websites, based on multiple sources
(e.g. reputable third-party news and fact-checking organizations). Along this approach, we characterize a list of
websites that notably produce disinformation, i.e. low-credibility content, false, misleading and/or hyper-partisan news
reports as well as hoaxes, conspiracy theories and satire. We oppose to these malicious sources a set of traditional news
outlets (defined as in [5]) which deliver mainstream reliable news, i.e. factual, objective and credible information; we
are aware that this might not be always true as reported cases of misinformation on mainstream outlets are not rare
[12], yet we adopt this approach as it is currently the best available proxy for a correct classification.
Data collection
We collected all tweets containing a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) pointing to websites which belong either to a
disinformation or mainstream domain (see below). Following the approach described in [9, 12] we assume that article
labels are associated with the label of their source, i.e. all items published on a disinformation (mainstream) website
are disinformation (mainstream) articles. We took into account censoring effects described in [8], by retaining only
diffusion cascades relative to articles that were published after the beginning of the collection process (left censoring),
and observing each of them for at least one week (right censoring).
For what concerns disinformation sources we referred to the curated list of 100+ news outlets provided by [21, 23].
Leveraging Hoaxy API1, we obtained tweets pertaining to news items published in the period from Jan, 1st 2019 to
March, 15th 2019, filtering articles with less than 50 associated tweets. The final collection comprises 5775 diffusion
networks.
We replicated the collection procedure described in [21, 23] in order to gather mainstream articles by using the Twit-
ter Streaming API. We referred to U.S. most trusted news sources described in [14] (list available in Supplementary
Material). We associated tweets to a given article after canonicalization of the attached URL(s), using tracking param-
1https://rapidapi.com/truthy/api/hoaxy
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eters as in [21, 23], to handle duplicated hyperlinks. We collected the tweets during a window of three weeks, from
February 25th 2019 to March 18th 2019; ; we restricted the period w.r.t the disinformation collection in order to obtain
a balanced dataset of the two news domains2. At the end of the collection, we excluded articles for which the number
of associated tweets was less than 50, obtaining 6978 diffusion networks.
Eventually, mainstream news generated ∼1.7 million tweets, corresponding to ∼400k independent cascades, ∼680k
unique users and ∼ 1.2 million edges; disinformation news generated ∼1.6 million tweets, ∼210k independent cas-
cades, ∼420k unique users and ∼1.4 million edges.
Twitter diffusion networks
We represent re-tweeting diffusion networks as directed, unweighted graphs: for each unique URL we build a graph
where each node represents a unique user who has shared at least one tweet containing a URL of the article, and a
directed edge is built between two nodes whenever a user re-tweets/quotes, mentions or replies to another user. Edges
between nodes are built only once and they all have weight equal to 1. Isolated nodes correspond to users who authored
tweets which were not re-tweeted nor replied/quoted/mentioned.
As pointed out in [26, 23, 8] it is impossible on Twitter to retrieve true diffusion cascades because the re-tweeting
functionality makes any re-tweet pointing to the original content, losing intermediate re-tweeting users. As such, the
majority of cascades often end up in star topologies. In contrast to [26], we consider as a single diffusion network the
union of several cascades generated from different users which shared the same news article on the social network;
thus such network is not necessarily a single connected component.
Global Network Properties
We computed the following set of global network properties, allowing us to encode each network by a tuple of features:
(a) the number of strongly connected components, (b) the size of the largest strongly connected component, (c) the
number of weakly connected components, (d) the size and (e) the diameter of the largest weakly connected component,
(f) the average clustering coefficient and (g) the main K-core number. More details on these features are available in
Supplementary Material.
We observed what follows: (a) is highly correlated with the size of the network (see Supplementary Material), as the
diffusion flow of news mostly occurs in a broadcast manner, i.e. edges almost consist of re-tweets, and (b) allows to
capture cases where the mono-directionality of the information diffusion is broken; (c) indicates approximately the
number of distinct cascades, with exceptions corresponding to cases where two or more cascades are merged together
via mentions/quotes/replies on Twitter; (d) and (e) represent respectively the size and the depth of the largest cascade
of a given news article; (f) indicates the degree to which users in diffusion networks tend to form local cliques whereas
(g) is commonly employed in social networks to identify influential users and to describe the efficiency of information
spreading [23].
We stress that considering an exhaustive search on additional network global indicators is out of the goal of our
analysis, which is to show that a set of simple network features, manually selected, can be effectively used in the task
of classifying diffusion networks.
Network Distances
In addition, we considered two alignment-free network distances that are commonly used in the literature to assess
the topological similarity of networks, namely the Directed Graphlet Correlation Distance (DGCD) and the Portrait
Divergence (PD).
The first distance [20] is based on directed graphlets [10]. These are used to catch specific topological information
and to build graph similarity measures; depending on the graphlets (and the orbits) considered, different DGCD can
be obtained, e.g. DGCD-13 is the one that we employed in this work. Among all graphlet-based distances, which
often yield a prohibitive computational cost to compute graphlets, DGCD has been demonstrated as the most effective
at classifying networks from different domains.
The second distance [3], which was recently defined, is based on the network portrait [4], a graph invariant measure
which yields the same value for all graph isomorphisms. This distance is purely topological, as it involves comparing,
2A different classification approach using several data sampling strategies on networks in the same 3-week period is avail-
able in Supplementary Material. The number of disinformation networks is only ∼1200, resulting in an imbalanced dataset with
disinformation/mainstream proportion 1 to 5. Results are nonetheless in accordance with those provided in the main paper.
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via Jensen-Shannon divergence, the distribution of all shortest path lengths of two graphs; moreover, it can handle
disconnected networks and it is computationally efficient.
We also conducted experiments on several centrality measures distributions–such as total degree and betweenness
centrality–and results are available in the Supplementary Material. They overall perform worse than the above meth-
ods, in accordance with current literature on network comparison techniques [27].
Dataset Splitting
As we expect networks to exhibit different topological properties within different ranges of node sizes (see also Sup-
plementary Material), prior to our analyses, we partitioned the original collection of networks into subsets of similar
sizes. This simple heuristic criterion produced a splitting of the dataset into three subsets according to specific ranges
of cardinalities (see Table 1); we also considered the entire original dataset for comparison. Splitting proved effective
for improving the classification and also for highlighting interesting properties of diffusion networks.
Results
Before evaluating global network properties in a classification task, we employed a non-parametric statistical test,
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, to verify the null hypothesis (each individual feature has the same distribution in the
two classes). Hypothesis is rejected (α = 0.05) for all indicators in all data subsets, with a few exceptions on networks
of larger size. More details are available in Supplementary Material.
We then employed these features to train two traditional classifiers, namely Logistic Regression (LR) and K-Nearest
Neighbors (K-NN) (with different choices of the number k of neighbors). Experiments on other state-of-the-art clas-
sifiers, which exhibit comparable results, are described in Supplementary Material. Before training each model, we
applied feature standardization, as commonly required in traditional machine learning frameworks [1]. Finally we
evaluated performances of both classifiers using a 10-fold stratified-shuffle-split cross validation approach, with 90%
of the samples as training set and 10% as test set in each fold. In Figure 1 we show the resulting Receiver Operating
Characteristic curve (ROC) for both classifiers with corresponding Area Under the Curve (AUC) values. The perfor-
mance is in all cases much better than that of a random classifier. A more detailed evaluation involving other metrics
(precision, recall and F1-score) is available in Supplementary Material.
Next, we considered two specific classifiers, Support Vector Machines (SVM) and K-NN, applied to the network
similarity matrix computed considering network distances (DGCD and PD). In Figure 2, we report the Area Under the
Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (AUROC) values for the K-NN classifier, trained on top of PD and DGCD-
13 similarity matrix; we excluded SVM as it was considerably outperformed (results are available in Supplementary
Material). DGCD-13 was evaluated only on networks with less than 1000 nodes (which still account for over 95%
of the data) as the computational cost for larger networks was prohibitive. We carried out the same cross validation
procedure as previously described. Again, the performance of the classifiers is in all instances much better than the
baseline random classifier value.
Discussion
In a nutshell, we demonstrated that our choice of basic global network properties provides an accurate classification of
news articles based solely on their re-tweeting diffusion networks –AUROC in the range 0.75-0.93 with basic K-NN
and LR, and comparable or better performances with other state-of-the-art classifiers (see Supplementary Material);
the use of more complex network distances confirms the result, which is altogether in accordance with prior work on
the detection of online political astroturf campaigns [18].
For what concerns global network properties, comparing networks with similar sizes turned out to be the right choice,
yielding a general increase in all classification metrics (see Supplementary Material for more details). We experienced
the worst performances when classifying networks with smaller sizes (with less than 100 nodes); we argue that small
diffusion networks appear more similar and that differences across news domains emerge particularly when their size
increases.
For what concerns network distances, they overall exhibit a similar trend in classification performances, with worst
results on networks with less than 100 nodes and a slight improvement when considering the entire dataset; accuracy
in classifying networks with more that 1000 nodes is lower, perhaps due to data scarcity. DCGD and PD distances
appear equivalent in our specific classification task; the former is generally used in biology to efficiently cluster
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together similar networks and identify associated biological functions [20]. They reinforce the results of our more
naive approach involving a manual selection of the input features.
Understanding classification results in terms of input features is notably a controversial problem in machine learning
[13]. In the following we give our own qualitative interpretation of the results in terms of global network properties.
For networks with less than 1000 nodes, we observed that disinformation networks exhibit higher values of both size
and diameter of the largest weakly connected components; recalling that the largest weakly connected component
corresponds to the largest cascade, this result is in accordance with [26] where it is shown that false rumor cascades
spread deeper and broader than true ones.
For networks with more than 100 nodes, we noticed higher values of both size of the largest strongly connected
component and clustering coefficient in disinformation networks compared to mainstream ones. This denotes that
communities of users sharing disinformation tend to be more connected and clustered, with stronger interaction be-
tween users, whereas mainstream articles are shared in a more broadcast manner with less discussion between users.
A similar result was reported in [11] where a sample of most shared news was inspected in the context of 2016 US
presidential elections. Conversely, mainstream networks manifest a much larger number of weakly connected compo-
nents (or cascades). This is not surprising since traditional outlets have a larger audience than disinformation websites
[9, 5].
Finally, we observed that the main K-core number takes higher values in disinformation networks rather than in
mainstream ones. This result confirms considerations from [23] where authors perform a K-core decomposition of
a massive diffusion network produced on Twitter in the period of 2016 US presidential elections; they show that
disinformation proliferates in the core of the network. More details on differences between news domains, according
to the size of diffusion networks, are available in Supplementary Material.
A pictorial representation of these properties is provided in Figure 3, where we display two networks, with comparable
size, which represent the nearest individuals pertaining to both news domains in theD[100,1000) subset, i.e. the network
with the smallest Euclidean distance–in the feature space of global network properties–from all other individuals in
the same domain. Although they may appear similar at first sight, they actually exhibit different global properties. In
particular we observe that the disinformation network has a non-zero clustering coefficient, and higher value of size
and diameter of the largest weakly connected component, but a smaller number of weakly connected components w.r.t
to the mainstream network. Additional examples relative to other subsets are available in Supplementary Material.
Conclusions
Following the latest insights on the characterization of disinformation spreading on social media compared to more
traditional news, we investigated the topological structure of re-tweeting diffusion networks pertaining to distinct
domains. Leveraging different network comparison approaches, from manually selected global properties to more
elaborated network distances, we corroborate what previous research has suggested so far: disinformation spreads
out differently from mainstream news, and dissimilarities can be remarkably exploited to classify the two classes of
information using purely topological tools, i.e. basic global network indicators and standard machine learning.
We can qualitatively sum up these results as follows: disinformation spreads broadly and deeper than traditional news,
with a smaller global audience than mainstream, and communities sharing disinformation are more connected and
clustered. We believe that future research directions might successfully embody these results to develop real world
applications that could resolve and mitigate malicious information spreading on social media.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary Material can be requested by sending an e-mail to the corresponding author (e-mail:
francesco.pierri@polimi.it).
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No. nodes Mainstream networks Disinformation networks Label
all 6978 5575 Dall
[0, 100) 4177 2640 D[0,100)
[100, 1000) 2605 2900 D[100,1000)
[1000, +∞) 196 235 D[1000,+∞)
Table 1: The number of analyzed diffusion networks, in total (first row) and after splitting based on size (second to
last row). In the last column, the label used in the paper to denote the network subset.
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ROC of Logistic Regression
 Dall             AUC = 0.78 ± 0.02
 D[0, 100)      AUC = 0.74 ± 0.02
 D[100, 1000) AUC = 0.85 ± 0.02
 D[1000, + ) AUC = 0.93 ± 0.03
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ROC of K-NN (k=10)
 Dall             AUC = 0.77 ± 0.02
 D[0, 100)      AUC = 0.76 ± 0.01
 D[100, 1000) AUC = 0.85 ± 0.02
 D[1000, + ) AUC = 0.89 ± 0.04
Figure 1: ROC curves for Logistic Regression and K-NN (with k = 10) classifiers evaluated using global network
properties. The dashed line corresponds to the ROC of a random classifier baseline with AUC=0.5.
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Figure 2: AUROC values for K-NN classifiers (with different choices of k) using PD and DGCD-13 distances.
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Mainstream diffusion network
features:
WCC = 70 LWCC = 72 CC = 0
DWCC = 3 SCC = 205 LSCC = 1 KC = 1
Disinformation diffusion network
features:
WCC = 21 LWCC = 178 CC = 0.03
DWCC = 5 SCC = 220 LSCC = 2 KC = 2
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Figure 3: Top. Prototypical examples (the nearest individuals) of two diffusion networks in the subsetD[100,1000) of the
mainstream (left) and disinformation (right) domains. The size of nodes is adjusted according to their degree centrality,
i.e. the higher the degree value the larger the node. Middle. Feature values corresponding to the two examples (WCC
= Number of Weakly Connected Components; LWCC = Size of the Largest Weakly Connected Component; CC =
Average Clustering Coefficient; DWCC = Diameter of the Largest Weakly Connected Components; SCC = Number
of Strongly Connected Components; LSCC = Size of the Largest Strongly Connected Component; KC = Main K-
Core Number). Bottom. Box-plots of values of the three most significant features–WCC, LWCC, CC–highlighting
different distributions in the D[100,1000) subset of the two news domains.
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